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Statutory Construction in Federal Appellate Tax 
Cases: The Effect of Judges’ Social Backgrounds and 
of Other Aspects of Litigation 
Daniel M. Schneider* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The body of empirical legal research about how judges decide 
cases continues to expand, adding to the political science literature on 
the topic.1 Specifically, much has been written about how judges 
should interpret the Internal Revenue Code.2 However, the empirical 
research has failed to infuse the literature with observations about 
how judges presently interpret the Code. Indeed, lawyers have 
provided little empirical work addressing statutory interpretation.3 
Yet different judges theoretically could justify the same result in a 
particular case either summarily, through reliance on precedent, or by 
deferral to the Internal Revenue Service. In fact, they actually do 
justify results for similar cases in different fashions. What leads 
judges down these different paths? Unlike the other literature 
addressing the Code’s interpretation, this Article examines precisely 
that question. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. I would like to thank 
the participants at the Empirical Tax Workshop at Washington University School of Law for 
their comments, as well as Donald Songer, Jim Brudney, Fred Markowitz, Howard Erlanger, 
and Guadalupe Luna for data, advice, and comments. I would also like to thank Susan Boland 
and Terese Clarke, research librarians at the College of Law.  
 1. See, e.g., James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying 
the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675 (1999); Gregory 
C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial 
Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998). Although admittedly arbitrary, I choose to 
distinguish legal empirical research from more traditional social science research. 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. But see, e.g., Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: 
Statutory Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325 (2001); Brudney et al., 
supra note 1; Sisk et al., supra note 1. 
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In two earlier articles, I examined the effect of judges’ social 
backgrounds on their federal tax trial court decisions.4 I analyzed 
cases decided by the Tax Court and by three federal district courts 
over a twenty-year period. In one of these studies, I examined the 
same issue presented here, except at the trial court level, whether 
background influenced the way in which judges justified their 
decisions. My earlier work concluded that some aspects of 
background—most notably education—were in fact closely 
associated with the judges’ methods of justification.5  
Later, I examined the same set of cases to see whether background 
factors influenced actual outcomes.6 This proved to be a richer 
ground for investigation because many variables, especially gender, 
were strongly correlated with the prevailing party. The non-
traditional judges (e.g., judges who were not white, were women, or 
were educated at non-elite institutions) far more frequently and 
predictably found in the taxpayers’ favor. 
In my current research, I wanted to test the hypothesis that federal 
appellate judges’ rationale in justifying their decisions is fairly 
unaffected by social backgrounds, both in patterns seen in descriptive 
statistics and in predictions suggested by regressions. I expected this 
research to lead to results similar to those obtained in my trial courts 
research, and my theory was borne out by my findings. Relatively 
few patterns among the “descriptive statistics,” such as gender or 
race, were statistically significant. Those patterns that were 
statistically significant involved variables more related to “aspects” 
of the cases, such as taxpayer classification or legal representation, 
rather than those dealing with judges’ personal backgrounds. 
Similarly, background factors were not predictive of the method of 
interpretation judges used to justify decisions. “Aspects” variables 
again were richer and more predictive than social backgrounds, but 
even these were not strongly suggestive of outcome. Thus, I believe 
that these results support my hypothesis that social background is a 
poor indicator of the methods of statutory construction judges use in 
 
  4.  See Schneider, supra note 3; Daniel M. Schneider, Assessing and Predicting Who 
Wins Federal Tax Trial Decisions, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473 (2002). 
 5. Schneider, supra note 3. 
 6. Schneider, supra note 4. 
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justifying their decisions. I also believe that the current research 
reinforces my earlier work regarding statutory construction. 
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. First, I 
summarize the existing literature, both on the impact of social 
background on decision-making, as well as on Internal Revenue Code 
interpretation. Next, I present my methodology, explaining both how 
I selected cases and variables for the study, and also my methods of 
statistical analyses. Third, I set forth the results of my empirical 
research. Finally, I conclude the Article by restating my belief that 
the social background of judges who decided the sampled cases 
neither explains nor predicts how they would have justified their 
decisions in these tax cases. 
II. LITERATURE 
A. Empirical Research 
Law professors have published an increasing number of articles 
that use empirical research to examine judicial decisions. These 
articles ask whether a judge’s social background influences her 
decision, a position that contrasts with the more traditional legal view 
that judges dispassionately examine the law before them, rendering 
wholly unbiased decisions.7 
The legal research, in turn, flows from earlier political science 
literature looking at judges’ decisions.8 One school of thought argues 
that judges’ decisions are deeply influenced by their social 
backgrounds. Law professors appear to have applied this model more 
readily recently than political scientists. Regardless of the source of 
the model constructed, this empirical research concludes that 
background has some impact on judges’ decisions.9 
 
 7. Compare Brudney et al., supra note 1 (using empirical research), and Sisk et al., 
supra note 1 (using empirical research), with Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions 
Concerning the “Politics” of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 619 (1985) (applying traditional legal reasoning). 
 8. For a summary of earlier political science literature, see Schneider, supra note 4, at 
477-83. 
 9. Compare Brudney et al., supra note 1, and Sisk et al., supra note 1 (law professors 
finding limited effect), with C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory 
Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 35 AMER. J. POL. 
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B. Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code 
Statutes are necessarily subject to interpretation—they do not 
spring forth like the Greek goddess Athena, fully formed (and 
presumably fully understood) from the head of a parent. Compelling 
and competing theories have suggested all manners of interpretation. 
In turn, the tax literature reflects the broader debate about statutory 
construction; federal tax, after all, is based upon an extensive 
statutory system—the Internal Revenue Code.  
Another article within this symposium volume proposes a 
profound, broad model for examining the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Code in federal tax cases that come before the 
Court.10 I have engaged in a more limited empirical analysis for 
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code for several reasons. First, 
this narrower focus reflects the more traditional methods with which 
lawyers have interpreted the Code such as taking its words literally, 
relying upon regulations, or engaging in one of the other methods of 
interpretation. Literature about Code construction has used these 
traditional pigeonholes, and by following that literature, we may 
measure reasonable expectations against actual results. Another 
benefit of the more limited analysis is that it extends my prior 
 
SCIENCE 460 (1991); S. Sidney Ulmer, Are Social Background Models Time-Bound?, 80 AMER. 
POL. SCIENCE REV. 957 (1986); Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges’ Attributes and Case 
Characteristics: An Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 
JUDICATURE 277 (1988) (political scientists). 
 The social background model is not the sole political science model explaining judges’ 
actions. Another view is the attitudinal model, the belief that “the justices base their decisions 
on the merits of the facts of the case juxtaposed against their personal policy preferences.” 
Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED 312 (2d ed. 2002). This theory is drawn from “key concepts” derived “from legal 
realism, political science, psychology, and economics . . . [and] holds that the Supreme Court 
decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of 
the justices.” Id. at 86. A third, competing, view is that judges plan strategically, voting in 
certain ways in group settings in order to achieve their goals. For a readily available and 
succinct history of strategic planning, see Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of 
Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1655-65 (1998). My Article 
pursues the social background model in part because of its established ability to explain judicial 
decisions, and in part because of my past use of the model. By constructing a baseline using a 
consistent measurement—the social background model—the literature on federal tax decisions 
might more easily be advanced.  
 10. See Lee Epstein et al., Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and 
Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 303 (2003). 
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research, and thus strengthens the baseline by which federal tax 
decisions can be assessed through empirical study.11 
The possible methods for interpreting the Internal Revenue Code 
considered and examined in this Article are:  
 Strict construction of a statute;  
 Deference to the Internal Revenue Service;  
 Deference to the Code’s structure;  
 Deference to a Code section’s legislative history;  
 Reliance on precedent; and 
 Total absence of interpretation revealed due to summary 
dispositions. 
In its simplest form, Code interpretation devolves into an 
argument about whether it should be interpreted literally, a question 
which is also posed in the broader debate of statutory construction.12 
Taking the Code’s language literally seems fairly straightforward. 
This naturally defers to Congress, espousing a simple belief that 
Congress must have “meant what it said,” and that it is not the proper 
function of a court to substitute its own judgment.13 It has been said 
that a judge should take the words in the statute within the range of 
“meanings that their text, taken in context, has in ordinary speech or 
in other provisions of the Code.”14 By contrast, a nonliteral meaning 
might “provoke us to think, ‘If that is what Congress meant, it should 
 
 11. Another significant aspect of this Article addresses the fact that, as has been 
suggested, see id., most research regarding judicial decision-making focuses on the United 
States Supreme Court. Fewer law review articles have examined how judges decide at the 
appellate or trial level. Cf. Sisk et al., supra note 1 (examining trial decisions); Brudney et al., 
supra note 1 (examining appellate decisions).  
 12. See, e.g., Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, “Purposivism,” and the 
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996). 
 13. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax 
Code, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1501 (1997); cf. Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and 
Doctrinal Incoherence, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 771 (1997) (noting the Supreme Court’s increasing 
reliance on “plain meaning” of statutes when deciding tax cases). See also Joseph Isenbergh, 
Review: Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859 (1982) (arguing 
the risks of nonliteral interpretations). 
 14. Coverdale, supra note 13, at 1503-04 (footnote omitted). 
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have said so rather than saying something very different.’”15 
Tax statutes, however, have long been interpreted nonliterally by 
some scholars. One approach is deference to the implementing 
agency or, in this case, to the Internal Revenue Service. A highwater 
mark of deference was etched by the Supreme Court in Chevron, 
USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,16 which held 
that if Congress had not “directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue . . . [and if] the agency’s answer . . . [is] based on a permissible 
construction of the statute,” then the regulation controls.17 While 
rarely applied to tax cases,18 implicit in this environmental law 
decision is a theoretical deference first to Congress, and then to the 
agency.19 
Another approach defers to the purpose of a statute, which in turn 
is part of a larger collection of statutes assembled into a framework. 
Arguably, there is a “theoretical construct that overarches the sum 
total of the entire Internal Revenue Code and is intended to be 
captured by it . . . and that statutory structure could come within the 
umbrella of statutory purpose.”20 This sense of a section’s purpose or 
structure is “a joint effort between Congress and the courts . . . [in 
which] Congress’s law . . . includes that larger statutory structure.”21 
Yet another approach is to rely upon a statute’s legislative history. 
As has been suggested, “[t]he argument in favor of using legislative 
history, simply put, is that context is important to the ascertainment 
 
 15. Id. at 1504. 
 16. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 17. Id. at 842-43. 
 18. The Chevron case has garnered little attention in tax cases. See Heen, supra note 13, at 
784-86; Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 
B.U. L. REV. 841 (1992) (discussing the Chevron case); Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: 
Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX. REV. 51 (1996) (discussing the Chevron case); 
Samuel B. Sterrett, Suggested Approach for Judicial Interpretation of Regulations That Grant 
Discretion to Taxpayers, 12 VA. TAX REV. 477 (1993) (discussing post-Chevron Supreme 
Court decisions). 
 19. See Heen, supra note 13, at 781. 
 20. Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX 
REV. 492, 497, 502 (1995). See also Beverly I. Moran & Daniel M. Schneider, The Elephant 
and the Four Blind Men: The Burger Court and Its Federal Tax Decisions, 39 HOW. L. REV. 
841, 928-42 (speaking about the “deep structure” of the Code). 
 21. See Geier, supra note 20, at 508 (citation omitted). Geier provides examples of courts 
respecting the purpose of a statute. Id. at 500-01. 
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of meaning, and legislative history is an important part of context.”22 
While two other approaches lack profound theoretical 
underpinnings, federal tax cases cannot be read without noting their 
prevalence among the tools judges use when making decisions. First, 
many judges rely strictly upon precedent when deciding cases. While 
there may be no strong, contemporary articulation of this view, it has 
certain and substantial roots in American legal traditions.23 Second, 
courts frequently dispose of cases summarily. Some cases either do 
not require, or at least do not offer, any substantial guidance for 
interpreting the Code; sometimes a judge simply applies the law to 
the facts. 
These normative approaches, of course, advance our 
understanding of the Internal Revenue Code. However, none offer 
empirical evidence of judges’ methods in tax cases. They neither 
suggest nor even comprehend, for example, that less elitely educated 
judges might use strict construction more often than their more elitely 
educated colleagues, or that we could similarly predict that the older 
judges would use that method more often than the more recent 
judges. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
The results drawn from my case review flow directly from my 
case selection and sorting methods. Criteria by which cases were 
selected and sampled are therefore set forth below. Some choices 
 
 22. Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the 
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 845 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
 23. See SPAETH & SEGAL, supra note 9, at 5-15 (discussing contemporary proponents of 
the precedent approach, such as Ronald Dworkin). Somewhat associated with the reliance on 
precedent is practical reasoning: the idea that, when interpreting the Code, a judge must 
consider statutory text, legislative history, and evolutive considerations—including judicial and 
administrative precedents and applicable current values—together with the consequences of 
alternate interpretations and the court’s own policy sense. While these sources of meaning 
typically would be considered in descending order of priority, the precise mix of sources 
depends upon the nature of the provision in question and the facts of the case at hand. 
 A practical reason approach provides both the correct method of deciding tax cases and an 
accurate description of what courts actually do in such cases. See Livingston, supra note 12, at 
720. Practical reasoning is not the same as reliance on precedent because it uses other methods 
of interpretation and, more importantly, because it suggests a particular way to apply the 
methods of interpretation—strict construction, legislative history, and “evolutive” methods.  
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varied from those I made in previous studies, including my use of a 
shorter and different time period. Other choices did not vary, because 
I wanted to replicate earlier benchmarks as much as possible, in order 
to permit earlier results to be more easily contrasted with the current 
ones. 
A. Data and Variables 
1. Case Selection 
The database includes all federal tax decisions rendered by all 
federal circuits. I wanted to sort the cases by circuit and by the 
appearance of tax matters, making traditional reporters like the 
Federal Reporter, and the specialty reporters, American Federal Tax 
Reports and United States Tax Cases, inadequate for the task. 
Instead, I engaged in online research,24 sampling about ten percent of 
all listed circuit decisions regarding federal tax during a recent five-
year period. 
a. Courts selected 
At the trial level, federal tax cases are decided by the Tax Court, 
district courts, and the Court of Federal Claims.25 Appeals from 
decisions rendered by the former two courts appear before the 
appropriate United States Circuit Court of Appeals. If an action is 
filed in the Court of Federal Claims, however, then appeals are heard 
by the Federal Circuit.26 
One shortcoming of my earlier research on trial decisions was that 
I reviewed only selected district courts. Such an approach was 
necessitated by the large number of district courts (91), as well as my 
 
 24. Using the online WESTLAW database, I executed the following search:  
PR([the circuit to be examined, such as “SIXTH”]) & CIRCUIT & DATE([a year 
from 1996 to 2000, inclusive]) 
 25. Taxpayers who seek a refund file their claims either in the Court of Federal Claims or 
else in the appropriate district court. Taxpayers who do not seek a refund litigate in the Tax 
Court. See I.R.C. §§ 7441-42, 6213(a) (1999) (defining Tax Court jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1345(a)(1) (2000) (defining district court and Court of Federal Claims court jurisdiction). 
 26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295. 
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desire to reach more discrete conclusions about particular district 
courts, rather than broad conclusions about all district courts. There 
are fewer federal appellate courts, making them easier than the trial 
courts to approach as a group. An anticipated and intended benefit of 
the current research was that results could be drawn about the breadth 
of federal appellate tax decisions included in the database. Thus, 
decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit and the First through 
Eleventh Circuits were examined.27 
b. The period reviewed  
I reviewed the most recent five-year period for which cases were 
available when I began my research, from 1996 through 2000. Earlier 
research suggested the importance of gender and race in my study of 
the effect of social background factors on the prevailing party.28 
Because passage of time has only favored diversity on the bench,29 a 
more recent period was more appropriate for this research.30 Finally, 
a multi-year spectrum (five years) minimizes the risk of a temporary 
aberration than an even shorter, one-year base might present. 
c. Published v. unpublished cases 
Authors have varied in their approach as to whether to review all 
cases or only those that have been published.31 The wider universe of 
 
 27. Although I also collected data about the Federal Circuit, there was marginally less 
biographical information for the judges on this circuit. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit is a 
more specialized court, hearing several specialized appeals, including those of tax litigants from 
the Court of Federal Claims. In contrast, the circuits included in the database are more general, 
hearing appeals from any district court or Tax Court decision (assuming that jurisdictional 
prerequisites are met). See supra notes 25-26. 
 28. See Schneider, supra note 4. 
 29. See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 346-65 (1997). 
 30. While a broader, twenty-year period was appropriate in the earlier articles, the passage 
of time turned out to be less critical to my analysis, whereas gender and race were more so. See 
Schneider, supra note 4, at 488 n.54, 506 nn.142, 515. Thus, I used a shorter period in order to 
obtain more decisions for which the judges had not been white or had been women. I was 
willing to risk the potential loss of trends defined by time, given the apparent unimportance of 
the passage of time in my earlier study. 
 31. For examples in the literature, compare Brudney et al., supra note 1 (reviewing all 
appellate decisions in database) with Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The 
Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 263-65 (1995) 
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cases, including those that were not published but were nevertheless 
set forth in slip opinions or online databases, are now easier to obtain 
than they once were. Reviewing all cases minimizes the risk of bias. 
On the other hand, reviewing only published cases might be justified 
if there is no actual bias or if limitations are imposed by resources. 
Obviously, reviewing only some cases is accomplished more easily 
than reviewing all cases. 
This Article uses cases in the WESTLAW database, which 
includes both published and unpublished cases. Cases were excluded 
if they were so vague or brief that I could not characterize the 
approach used to justify the decision. These vague or sparse 
decisions, it turned out, tended to be the unpublished decisions.32 
d. Sampling 
I read every tenth case. Because some of the cases in the database 
had to be excluded,33 I actually read more than ten percent of the 
federal tax appellate decisions captured by the WESTLAW search.34 
 
(reviewing only relevant, filed decisions in database). See generally Deborah Jones Merritt & 
James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts 
of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 72-73 (2001) (examining the effects of the selective 
publication of appellate decisions). 
 Case law also exists on this point. Compare Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.2d 1155, 1180 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (upholding Ninth Circuit rule that unpublished opinions may be cited only for factual 
purpose), with Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding a rule 
prohibiting the use of unpublished opinions to be unconstitutional), vacated for mootness, 
Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). See generally Johanna S. Schiavoni, 
Comment, Who’s Afraid of Precedent?: The Debate over the Precedential Value of 
Unpublished Opinions, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1859 (2002) (arguing in favor of greater reliance on 
unpublished opinions). 
 32. With very few exceptions, only published cases provided usable data. Most of the 
cases that appeared in the WESTLAW database (excluding AFTR2d and USTC cases) were un-
useable. WESTLAW citations not appearing in either of these reporters usually lacked 
information, or else the area of the decision had nothing to do with federal tax, but had 
somehow been included among the cases captured by the WESTLAW search.  
 33. For example, in one search of Tenth Circuit cases, the database for some reason 
returned a Third Circuit decision. In another, the database returned a non-tax decision 
addressing drug possession. These cases, along with similar anomalies, were excluded from the 
present study. 
 34. After randomly selecting one of the first ten cases to come up in the search, I read 
every tenth case. This process was repeated for each circuit and each year. While it is unlikely 
that the first case decided by a circuit in a given year is somehow different than the second, 
third, or tenth, random selection of the first case for review minimizes the risk that differences 
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By following statistical protocols, I was able to minimize the 
inaccuracies that can result from sampling and not including all cases 
in a study. 
Of the cases sampled, I then selected only those cases in which 
there was one or more signed opinion.35 My rationale was that the 
judge who authored an opinion—whether in the majority, 
concurrence, or dissent—was the judge responsible for justifying the 
decision. This view was consistent with my prior research.36 While 
judges on a panel might negotiate when deciding appellate cases, 
they are more likely to haggle over who should win the case than 
over the exact means of justification for the decision.37 While others 
might take a different approach, such as assigning equal weight to all 
judges who consented to the opinion, I chose not to follow this 
course.38 
Per curiam cases were excluded from the sample because no one 
individual’s background could be associated with those opinions. On 
the other hand, concurring and dissenting opinions were included, 
carrying the same weight as majority opinions; for each such opinion, 
an identifiable judge, with an assessable background, had authored 
that opinion. 
 
will occur, avoiding bias in the results. 
 A case listed in the WESTLAW search might be excluded for a number of reasons: the 
case, as a practical matter, was entirely unrelated to tax; it was from a circuit other than the one 
under scrutiny; it could not be located; or it lacked enough information to be useful (i.e., the 
opinion was so summary that the subject matter was indiscernable). 
 To check the accumulated data, I compared a hard-copy source (AFTR2d more often than 
F.3d) with the same case in the WESTLAW database. The data was usually the same (e.g., the 
same judges, the same votes); the most notable inconsistency was the case’s precedential value, 
as characterized by the deciding court. When only one source was available, I used that source; 
when the data differed between the two different sources, I used the data from the LEXIS 
database because it appeared to be more accurate.  
 35. I am indebted to the members of the Empirical Tax Workshop for this suggestion. 
There are other sampling options, most notably the assignment of equal weight to each vote on 
a judicial panel. This approach, however, accords the same weight to a judge who merely voted 
for the opinion as to the authoring judge. 
 36. See Schneider, supra note 4; Schneider, supra note 3. 
 37. Id. Note that highly dissatisfied judges always have the option to issue concurring or 
dissenting opinions, which were also reviewed for this study. 
 38. Cf. Brudney et al., supra note 1 (assigning equal weight to all three members of panel, 
but in assessing social background factors’ effect on labor law cases). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p257 Schneider.doc  9/11/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
268 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 13:257 
 
2. Variables 
I collected data about the cases and about the judges who decided 
the cases. The variables include: 
Data About the Judge39 
a. Name. 
b. Gender.40 
c. Race. 
d. Educational background. 
i) Did the judge attend an elite college?41 
ii) Did the judge attend an elite law school?42 
 
 39. The source of biographical information upon which I relied was the Federal Judicial 
Center, the website for which is found at http://www.fjc.gov. To minimize error, I checked my 
entries for accuracy of information—including educational institutions attended, gender, 
appointing president, and race—at least twice against information obtained from the website. I 
also re-checked the entries as I coded them for statistical analysis, see infra notes 40-41, at least 
one additional time. 
 40. The coding of data is important for multinomial logistic regression, which is the 
method used in this study to establish relationships between winning parties and social 
background variables. Coding is therefore set forth where appropriate (e.g., coding for gender, 
with female=0 and male=1). 
 41. Selectivity of college is revealed by the numerous guides to American colleges and 
universities. For this study, I used an older reference. ALEXANDER W. ASTIN, WHO GOES 
WHERE TO COLLEGE? 58-83 (1965). Astin establishes the relative selectivity of an 
undergraduate institution by dividing the “highly able students who [wanted] to enroll at the 
college . . . by the number of freshmen admitted.” Id. at 55. Compare Brudney et al., supra note 
1, at 1703 (using Astin’s measurements), with Sisk et al., supra note 1 (not using undergraduate 
degree as a variable). See also GOLDMAN, supra note 29, at 346-65 (distinguishing between 
public and private institutions, as well as between the Ivy League and other schools).  
 Astin seemed to provide the most appropriate guide for several reasons. First, many of the 
judges were in college closer to the time when he was measuring selectivity of institutions (his 
treatise was published in 1965). The mean year of birth for the judges in the sampled cases was 
1935. Second, perceptions of institutional eliteness change slowly. For example, Harvard has 
remained a prestigious institution over a long period of time. See Brudney et al., supra note 1, 
at 1704 n.105. Finally, I had used the Astin scale in my earlier articles, see Schneider, supra 
note 4; Schneider, supra note 3, and thus hoped to increase my ability to contrast the judgments 
made in each by remaining consistent. 
 42. The 1977 Cartter Report includes fifteen law schools in its “elite” category—Harvard, 
Yale, Stanford, Michigan, Chicago, Berkeley, Columbia, Pennsylvania, Virginia, UCLA, 
Cornell, Texas, Duke, Northwestern, and NYU. See The Cartter Report on the Leading Schools 
of Education, Law, and Business, CHANGE, Feb. 1977, at 44, 46. Another researcher substituted 
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e. Primary professional experience before appointment to the 
appellate bench.  
i) Had his career been primarily in private practice, 
government (legal or nonlegal), other judicial appointment, 
law school teaching, or even some other, nonlegal capacity?43 
f. Political ideologies, as measured on a scale calculating the 
economic liberalism of the judge’s appointing President.44 
 
three other schools of her choice in defining the fifteen elite law schools. See Diana Fossum, 
Law Professor: A Profile of the Teaching Branch of the Profession, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. 
J. 501, 507 (1980) (substituting Georgetown, Iowa, and Wisconsin for Cornell, Duke, and 
UCLA). See also Sisk et al., supra note 1, at 1418-19 (providing the authors’ own list of seven 
elite schools). For purposes of this Article, I treat all eighteen of the Cartter Report’s and 
Fossum’s schools as elite schools and all of the rest as non-elite. Again, this is consistent with 
my earlier articles, increasing my ability to contrast them. The judges’ legal educations were 
coded for the study (nonelite=0 and elite=1). 
 43. I determined this variable by quantitatively examining years of service, choosing the 
profession with the longest tenure. This avoided a “last in time prevails” rule, which would be 
problematic. Using this measurement, most judges’ primary professions were fairly clear; they 
rarely skipped from government work to private practice and back. Although I made separate 
entries for private and corporate practices, I collapsed the two into one category due to the small 
number of judges who had worked primarily for corporations. In both situations, the individual 
represented private interests, and so the combination was both apt and theoretically and 
methodologically justified. 
 In the event that a judge had devoted an equal amount of time to two separate lines of 
work, I treated the judge as having engaged primarily in the more recent of the two. If a judge 
appeared to engage in two overlapping jobs—most often, private practitioner and legislator, or 
private practitioner and teacher—I chose what appeared to be the more important career as the 
primary professional experience. Inevitably, I chose private practice. 
 In other instances, judges had been either public defenders or general counsel to nonprofit 
organizations. I treated those judges, respectively, as having been engaged in private practice 
and in corporate practice. This is because the predominant character of those jobs was the 
representation of individual clients or of corporate entities. There are other ways in which to 
characterize careers.  
 Other researchers have drawn more discrete distinctions when examining prior professional 
experience. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001); Brudney et 
al., supra note 1; James Edward Maule, Instant Replay, Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls: An 
Empirical Study of Alleged Tax Court Judge Bias, 66 TENN. L. REV. 351 (1999); Sisk et al., 
supra note 1. In part, I was again motivated by a desire to use the same measurements as I had 
used in my earlier articles. 
 44. In my earlier research, I used a standard proxy for the political views of the judge 
himself: the political affiliation of the President who appointed the judge. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, 
supra note 29, at 355-57 (suggesting that the Presidents from Eisenhower to Reagan appointed 
federal appellate judges from their own political parties over ninety percent of the time). 
President Carter appointed relatively fewer appellate judges from his own party, yet even his 
percentage was more than eighty-two percent. Id. at 355. See also ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD 
STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 237, 241 (4th ed. 1998) (reporting ninety percent of 
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g. Data about the judge’s judicial career, including length of 
tenure on the bench at the time the opinion was rendered.45 
h. Religion.46  
j. Year of birth. 
h. The nature of the judge’s opinion (i.e., majority, 
concurrence, or dissent). 
Data About the Decision 
a. The court in which the case was decided. 
b. The year of the decision. 
c. The principal Internal Revenue Code section at issue in the 
case. 
 
federal judges are of the same political party as his appointing President). To provide 
consistency, this was measured by the President who had appointed the judge to the bench from 
which he rendered the decision. Thus, if President Reagan had appointed Judge Smith to the 
district court, and President Clinton later appointed him to the court of appeals, Reagan was still 
treated as the appointing President for those opinions rendered while Smith was a district court 
judge. However, President Clinton was treated as the appointing president for Judge Smith’s 
opinions rendered while he was an appellate judge.  
 Scholars have suggested a variety of ways to measure judges’ and appointing Presidents’ 
political views. See Robert A. Howard & David C. Nixon, Local Control of the Bureaucracy: 
Federal Appeals Courts,Ideology and the Internal Revenue Service, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
233 (2003). I have used an “economic liberalism measure.” See generally Jeffrey A. Segal et 
al., Buyer Beware? Presidential Success through Supreme Court Appointments, 53 POL. 
RESEARCH Q. 557 (2000) (defining the economic liberalism approach). See also infra tbl. 1. 
These authors rank the Presidents’ economic liberalism for all Presidents from Franklin 
Roosevelt through Bill Clinton. The scores ranged from zero (most conservative) to one 
hundred (most liberal). With a score of 17.6, Ronald Reagan was the most conservative, while 
Franklin Roosevelt, with a score of 82.5, was the most liberal. Id.  
 I used this scale for two reasons. First, it was readily understandable. Second, many of the 
alternative measures focused heavily on judges’ views about civil liberties and similar topics, 
most of which are far afield from tax. While economic liberalism was not a clear match with tax 
law, I nevertheless felt that it came closer to accurately measuring judges’ views about tax, via 
appointing presidents, than did the other standards. 
 45. In order to provide consistency, length of tenure between appointment and rendering 
of the decision was always measured from the time the judge assumed the particular bench from 
which he rendered the decision under scrutiny.  
 46. This information came from a database about federal appellate judges prepared by 
Professors Donald Songer and Gerry Gryski. Professor Songer graciously provided the data, 
which is available with the author of this Article. Data on religion was unavailable for judges 
not sitting on a Court of Appeals, judges whose religion was unknown, and appellate judges 
appointed after 1994. 
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d. The court’s action on the case (e.g., affirmance or 
dismissal).  
 i) Courts were almost invariably clear about their actions. In 
those few cases in which the court was silent about its action, I 
engaged in an appropriate characterization (e.g., treating the 
court’s summary rejection of all of the appellant’s claims as an 
affirmance). 
e. The prevailing party.47 
 i) I determined who won a case by examining multiple 
factors. At the very least, I had no expectation about where my 
analysis would lead regarding this variable, which somewhat 
diminished bias. 
f. Presence of legal representation.48  
g. The taxpayer’s legal status (e.g., individual, business).49 
h. The number of issues decided by the court.50 
 
 47. It was important to dichotomize the prevailing party into two groups in order to 
promote statistical analyses. While the most obvious division in tax is between the taxpayer and 
the government, such a split does not always literally describe the case. Sometimes an Internal 
Revenue Service agent was the named party in an action against a taxpayer. I treated that named 
party as if he were the government for purposes of coding, because the agent could clearly be 
aligned against someone aiming to protect her rights as a taxpayer.  
 As I read cases, I deemed decisions stated by the courts to be in favor of the government or 
against the taxpayer at face value (and vice versa), when coding, although I still read the cases 
in order to confirm independently the courts’ conclusions. Even if the winner did not have all of 
its expectations met, for example if the taxpayer paid only some portion of the tax it argued it 
had never owed, that party was still treated as the winner. 
 48. One question often asked about my earlier research was whether the taxpayer’s form 
of representation affected the measured outcome. While I did not think representation would 
matter, I was unable to prove the point empirically. I therefore included this variable in my 
current research. 
 When the taxpayer represented herself, but with legal counsel also listed, I treated that 
taxpayer as being represented by a lawyer. In such cases, the taxpayer had the benefit of 
counsel and should thus be treated as having representation, despite her choice to participate 
actively in her own action. 
 49. Another question raised regarding my earlier research was whether the taxpayer’s 
status (i.e., corporation, individual, etc.) affected the outcome. For example, judges might have 
particular biases against corporations. While I did not think that this variable would correlate 
with judicial outcomes, I nevertheless included this variable in the current database. 
 
 I made judgments about taxpayer status based on information that usually was readily 
apparent: inclusion of “Inc.” or “LLP” in the taxpayer’s name and inclusion (or lack thereof) of 
any legal characterization of the taxpayer’s name, description, or status within the opinion. 
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The benefit of coding for multiple issues is that it theoretically 
could strengthen the results of the current research. For example, if 
female judges were more likely to use precedent as a method for 
rationalizing their majority opinions, but not their concurring or 
dissenting opinions, then analyzing up to three methods for justifying 
the majority, or concurring or dissenting opinions, if there were any, 
could triple the chance of letting those patterns emerge. 
The number of issues in a case were often signaled by the court—
language such as “the sole issue presented in this case” or “the two 
questions to be answered here,” for example, revealed that one or two 
issues, respectively, were at play.51 In multiple-issue cases, I coded 
the first three issues, and also determined the winner on each of these 
issues, again using criteria already noted, such as the court’s stated 
action and my independent confirmation of the court’s conclusion.52 I 
tended to code the issues presented by a court in the same sequence 
in which they were presented by the court.53  
Few cases had more than three issues. In those few that did, my 
decision not to catalogue all the issues was not fatal, because I was 
interested in determining whether multiple issues might account for 
 
 50. See Schneider, supra note 3, at 341 n.91. One change in coding from my earlier 
research was the addition of a variable for whether one or more issues were decided by the 
court. I had been surprised that trial courts had mixed methods when interpreting the Internal 
Revenue Code in order to sustain their decisions. For example, they combined strict 
construction of a Code section with practical reasoning. Previously, I could not address whether 
they had done so simply because two issues were at play, as I had not coded for that possibility. 
While I believe that most cases in my earlier databases had been one-issue cases, I could not 
confirm the accuracy of that belief. 
 51. Courts frequently set forth preliminary matters—including jurisdiction, background 
material, the general legislative scheme, or the lower court’s decision—before discussing 
resolution of an issue. They usually used signals, such as “Discussion” or “Analysis,” to set out 
these preliminary matters, which I did not treat as “issues” for purposes of this Article. 
 52. One way to limit unconscious bias in the coding of cases would be through the use of 
multiple research assistants who lack knowledge of the expected outcome. Because I coded the 
cases by myself, however, I could not use that safeguard. I recoded the most subjective 
material—the number of issues, grounds for justifying the decision, and the prevailing party. I 
believe that I further minimized bias by recoding the subjective material without knowledge of 
the objective social background material (in some cases, coding the social background material 
only after recoding the subjective material). This prevented me from recoding the prevailing 
party, for example, in such a way as to promote a particular hypothesis. For more on bias, see 
infra note 59. 
 53. If I did not code in this manner, it was because I had coded the most important or most 
dispositive issue first, with a less important or more tangential issue coming later. 
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use of different rationales for justifying a decision. This could be 
accomplished by simply determining whether multiple issues existed 
instead of the number of issues. 
Once I coded for multiple issues in majority opinions and had 
decided to sample the concurring and dissenting opinions authored by 
a specific judge, I also decided to code these concurrences and 
dissents for multiple issues. I did so along the lines set forth above. 
i. The rationale used by the court to justify its decision.  
There were two aspects to the coding of rationale. First, what were 
the possible rationales or justifications? The methods listed above,54 
literal v. nonliteral, in turn became strict construction, and deference 
to the Internal Revenue Service through reliance on its regulations, 
rulings, etc., the Code’s structure, a statute’s legislative history, 
precedent, and mere summary disposition. The second question 
aimed to determine the rationales actually used by the court. 
Judgments I made about the rationales used by a court depended, 
of course, upon the way in which the court drafted its opinion. As 
noted above, different judges might approach the same question in 
different ways.55 For example, one court might discuss a regulation, 
revenue ruling, or procedure, which clearly suggests its deference to 
the IRS. Another court might turn to precedent to bolster its reliance 
on a regulation and, if it discussed other cases, these opinions were 
treated as relying on this deference and on precedent. A third decision 
in which cases were discussed, but not the regulation (or if the 
regulation was touched on, then only very briefly), was treated as a 
case for which the rationale was precedent only. 
I listed up to three rationales for the first issue in the majority 
opinion, and only one rationale for each of the second and third 
issues. Again, because I wanted to ascertain whether the existence of 
multiple issues could account for use of different rationales, 
establishing multiple rationales for relatively less important issues 
was not critical and therefore not pursued. Because the first of three 
possible issues had been coded for the presentation of multiple 
rationales, I again increased the possibility that patterns might appear 
 
 54. See supra text following note 10. 
 
 55. See supra text following note 3. 
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in the results.56 In other words, that Protestant judges could have been 
predicted to use structure to justify their decisions could be tested 
against three possible rationales for the first issue, rather than just 
one. 
As with the number of issues, I also tried to follow a court’s lead 
when coding rationales. If an opinion listed two grounds for deciding 
an issue, each of which it discussed, I was more likely than not to 
find two rationales for that issue.57 As noted, I did not treat 
preliminary matters as issues, nor did I include the rationale used to 
justify that preliminary matter.58 
Concurrences and dissents were coded for rationales along the 
lines set forth above for coding rationales in majority opinion—one 
issue and up to three rationales.  
With the methodology of data gathering set forth, statistical 
analysis may be briefly noted before turning to a discussion of my 
results.59 
B. Statistical Analysis 
The explanatory (independent) variables in the database include 
the judge’s gender, race, eliteness of college and law school, primary 
pre-judicial professional experience, the appointing President’s 
economic liberalism, years on the bench when the sampled case was 
 
 56. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52. 
 57. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 58. Just as courts often signal the analysis of issue with a signal, such as “Discussion,” 
other textual signals were also used. For example, the court might say, “In the following two 
portions of this opinion, the court will discuss section x’s legislative history and the 
applicability of Revenue Ruling 98-xxx.” I considered this kind of formal decision as one factor 
in determining the number of distinct issues covered by an opinion.  
 59. Empirical research is always at risk for bias. I took steps to minimize my biases, 
whether explicit or implicit. First, I did not code the majority of the independent variables, the 
social background factors surrounding the judges themselves, until after I had coded other data 
about the cases. Second, much of the data about the cases was “objective” and unalterable (e.g., 
the circuit in which the case was decided or the deciding judge). I also ensured accurate data 
entry, discovering only one mistake in each of these two objective variables when recoding ten 
percent of all of the cases for accuracy confirmation. Third, I recoded the “subjective” variables 
about the cases—the number of issues presented, the prevailing party on each issue, and the 
stated judicial rationale—without knowledge of the deciding judges’ identities. 
 On this last point, I would like to make clear that the subjective matters, by their very 
nature, might be viewed differently by others, which is one of the reasons for my recoding. 
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decided, religious preference, whether the case was deemed by the 
court to have precedential value, whether the taxpayer was 
represented by a lawyer, and the taxpayer’s legal status. The outcome 
(dependent) variable was the method the court used to interpret the 
Internal Revenue Code in justifying its decision.  
Different statistical analyses sometimes dictated characterizations 
of outcomes, and so sometimes the outcome was expressed by noting 
all six methods of interpretation, especially in the regressions, and 
sometimes it was expressed as an either/or equation.60 The phrasing 
of the outcome is obviously important for understanding my results, 
and so I have always clearly noted the outcome below. 
Statistical significance for relationships was created through 
comparisons, such as between decisions by male and female judges, 
or between judges who had gone to more (or less) elite colleges, 
through appropriate tests.61 Multinomial logistic regression was used 
to establish relationships between the independent and the dependent 
variables.62 
As with the outcome, different statistical analyses sometimes 
dictated the use of different databases. The original database 
consisted of 419 decisions. Each of these decisions was parsed into 
its separate majority opinion and, because of concurrences and 
dissents, 25 opinions were added to the original database to create 
another database of 444 opinions. And, because I sometimes 
examined only authored decisions, I modified the 444 opinion 
database by excluding the 201 per curiam opinions, leaving a total of 
243 opinions in a second modified database. Again, I have identified 
the particular database used in order to aid in understanding my 
 
 60. For example, either reliance on regulations or all other methods of interpretation; 
either reliance on precedent or all other methods of interpretation. 
 61. I used the chi-squared test for cross-tabulations of dichotomous variables (e.g., 
gender, political affiliation), means comparison to establish significance for continuous data 
(e.g., length of tenure when deciding the case), and the Wald test for logistic regression. 
Statistical significance is “designed to allow us to make statements about the probability that 
hypothetical relationships actually occur”; it permits the inference that two variables are 
interrelated, in both the sample and the general population, such that the correlation is not 
merely the result of random association. GEORGE W. BOHRNSTEDT & DAVID KNOKE, 
STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL DATA ANALYSIS 22-23, 158 (3d ed. 1994). 
 
 62. Logistic regression permits the isolation and measurement of each independent 
variable’s effect, while controlling for the influence of other independent variables. See 
Schneider, supra note 3, at 490 n.61.  
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results. Generally, however, one of the two broader databases tended 
to be used more in the descriptive statistics while the third database 
was used exclusively for logistic regressions.63 
IV. RESULTS 
A. Descriptive Statistics—Who Were the Judges and How Did They 
Justify Their Decisions? 
The descriptive statistics drawn from the sampled cases tell 
several stories. Overall, some general observations can be made. We 
know something about who the judges were—white, male, and well-
educated. They relied heavily on precedent, whether writing majority, 
concurring, or dissenting opinions. Beyond that, they engaged in few 
statistically significant patterns, and so we cannot negate the random 
nature of the patterns revealed by these statistics. In other words, for 
example, while Latino judges or judges appointed by more 
economically liberal Presidents might have used a certain method of 
interpretation to justify their decisions, we cannot negate the 
possibility that such patterns were random. Further, because there are 
few statistically significant patterns, I believe that methods of 
justifying tax decisions were not very important to the judges who 
decided the sampled cases. 
Still, several observations may be made about the 419 cases in the 
original database and the judges in these cases.64 The smallest 
 
 63. The statistical analysis does not use cluster sampling, a method of making 
observations about the larger population of cases based on the smaller units in the population 
presented by the circuits. Traditional reasons for using sample clusters, such as the difficulty or 
expense of sampling the larger population, were not at issue here; the risk of decreased 
precision rendered the model’s use unadvisable. See SHARON L. LOHR, SAMPLING: DESIGN 
AND ANALYSIS 23-25 (1999) (discussing cluster sampling).  
 The use of a hierarchical model was also inappropriate. Hierarchical models use layered 
analyses, such as examining students who nest within a classroom, classrooms that nest within a 
school, and a school that nests within a community. See generally STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH 
& ANTHONY S. BRYK, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELS (2002) (discussing this model). Other 
legal studies of judges’ social backgrounds have similarly avoided hierarchical models. See, 
e.g., Sisk et al., supra note 1; Brudney et al., supra note 1. 
 64. As can be seen, I sometimes refer to the 419-case database and sometimes to the 
larger, 444-case database. While this may be confusing, I have done this because different 
inferences may be drawn from each database. The 444-case database includes all judges who 
authored opinions; it would be inappropriate to discuss the judges without using that base. See 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/8
p257 Schneider.doc  9/11/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]  Statutory Construction in Tax Cases 277 
 
percentage of opinions included in the database (three percent) were 
decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and the 
largest percentage, by the Ninth Circuit (twenty-four percent). Four 
hundred of the 419 cases were unanimous, where either one judge 
wrote an opinion with the other two judges joining, or else the 
opinion was simply an anonymously authored per curiam decision. In 
the remaining cases, five were cases in which there was only a 
concurrence, 13 contained only a dissent, one had two dissents, and 
five contained both a concurrence and a dissent. Solely unanimous 
decisions were rendered only by the First, Fourth, Seventh, Eight and 
Tenth Circuits. The circuit with the lowest percentage of non-
unanimous decisions was not the Ninth Circuit, the quality of whose 
opinions has been criticized,65 but rather the Sixth Circuit, with 
fifteen percent non-unanimous decisions.66 Of the total number of 
cases that were not unanimous, however, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits 
each decided 32 percent of them. 
Some of the features of the 444–case database are set forth below 
in Table 1. 
 
infra tbl. 1. The smaller database, however, examines only the cases; therefore, reference to that 
database is sometimes more appropriate. See infra tbl. 2.  
 65. Compare Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of 
Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711 (2000) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit has too many 
judges and that the quality of its decisions suffers as a result), and Marybeth Herald, Reversed, 
Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 
405 (1998) (noting the Ninth Circuit’s high reversal rate), with Jerome Farris, The Ninth 
Circuit—Most Maligned Circuit in the Country—Fact or Fiction?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465 
(1997) (arguing, as a Ninth Circuit judge, that the circuit is functioning well). 
 66. Cf. Posner, supra note 65, at 717 (arguing that, aside from the Federal Circuit, only 
the Sixth Circuit produced worse opinions than the Ninth Circuit). 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of the Judges (means and deviations, set forth in 
brackets, or percentages)67 
 
Characteristic  
gender (0=female, 1=male) .84 [.37] 
race  
black 
latino 
white 
 
4% 
5% 
91% 
Astin eliteness of undergraduate institution  63 [9] 
eliteness of law school (0=nonelite, 1=elite) .58 [.50] 
prior work 
government 
law school teacher 
judge 
private practice other 
other 
 
8% 
12% 
17% 
62% 
1% 
religion (N=192) 
Jewish 
Catholic 
Protestant  
other 
 
17% 
26% 
57% 
1% 
seniority (tenure) 13 [8] 
President’s economic liberalism 39 [21] 
Translated into more accessible language, several observations 
may be drawn from Table 1. Most of the judges—84 percent—were 
men.68 The judges were overwhelmingly white (91 percent of the 
total). They had gone to colleges such as Fordham, Tufts, and West 
 
 67. Except for the Astin measurements of school selectivity (n=235) and religion (n=192), 
the sample size for all of these characteristics is 244. The number of authoring judges for whom 
many characteristics are known is smaller than the total number of cases in the database 
because many of the cases were issued per curiam. See supra text following note 62. Means 
and deviations are not set forth where they would be meaningless, such as for religion and other 
non-ordered, discrete, multinomial variables. 
 68. This may be deduced from the mean for the judges’ gender, which is .84. This value 
tells us that the gender of sixteen percent of all judges were female (coded value=0), and 
eighty-four percent were male (coded value=1). 
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Point,69 and were more elitely educated at law school than not, 
because 58 percent had gone to an elite law school. A fairly 
substantial majority of the judges had come from private practice, 62 
percent, and others had come from other judicial positions, law 
school teaching or government work, in declining order. Most were 
Protestant, 57 percent, but some were Catholic and others, even 
fewer, Jewish. The average tenure of judges when they decided these 
tax cases was thirteen years, and they had been appointed by 
Presidents somewhat economically conservative (economically, more 
conservative than President Nixon, but more liberal than Presidents 
Ford and Eisenhower). 
 
Table 2 
Characteristics of the Cases (means and deviations, set forth in 
brackets, or percentages) 
 
Characteristic  
Type of taxpayer (N=438) 
trust or estate 
business 
individual  
other 
 
6% 
16% 
76% 
2% 
Appellant (N=444) (0=taxpayer, 1=government )  
.90 [.30] 
Prevailing party (N=441) (0=taxpayer, 
1=government ) 
 
.85 [.36] 
Taxpayer represented by counsel (N=400) (0=no, 
1=yes) 
 
.67 [47] 
Reported decision? (N=442) (0=no, 1=yes)  
.48 [.5] 
 
Most of the taxpayers—76 percent—were individuals and then, in 
decreasing numbers, businesses, trusts or estates, or some other type 
 
 69. These schools were among those assigned a score of 63 (the mean score) by 
Alexander Astin. See ASTIN, supra note 41. Other schools of a similar caliber include Iowa, 
Marquette, and Texas (with Astin scores of 62), the University of Pennsylvania and 
Washington & Lee (with Astin scores of 64). Id.  
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of entity. Taxpayers appealed more frequently than the government 
(and thus must have been more dissatisfied with the decisions at the 
trial level), but the government almost always won on appeal, 86 
percent of the time. Taxpayers usually were represented by counsel, 
two-thirds of the time, and the decisions were often unpublished, 55 
percent of the time. 
Tables 3–7 explain various aspects surrounding the numbers and 
types of issues presented in the cases, as well as the methods judges 
used to justify their decisions on these issues. As noted above, up to 
three issues were examined in majority opinions and one issue each 
was analyzed in concurring and dissenting opinions.  
Table 3 sets forth the number of issues that appeared in each case. 
 
Table 3 
Number of Issues/Case 
 
Issue N 
majority, first issue 419 
majority, second issue 202 
majority, third issue 139 
concurrence 9 
dissent 13 
 
In other words, all 419 cases had at least had at least one issue and 
one rationale, but only 202 majority opinions went on to spot a 
second issue, and even fewer, 139, had a third issue. Thus, most cases 
were not terribly complex, tending to be only one-issue cases. 
Table 4 sets forth the number of methods of interpretation used to 
justify each of the above issues. 
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Table 4 
Number of Methods of Interpretation/Issue 
 
Issue N 
majority, first issue,  
-first method 
 
419 
-second method 202 
-third method 139 
concurrence, first issue, 
-first method 
 
9 
-second method 3 
-third method 3 
dissent, first issue,  
-first method 
 
13 
-second method 8 
-third method 6 
 
As was true above, all 419 cases presented at least one issue in the 
majority opinion and had at least one method of construction in that 
issue. While not all cases presented multiple methods of construction, 
the drop-off from one to two (or three) methods of interpretation was 
not as conspicuous as the decline in the number of issues in Table 3. 
The uses of the methods tabulated in Table 4 have been dissected 
further in Tables 5–7, into majority, concurring and dissenting 
opinions, so that use of precedent, in combination, for example, with 
reliance on legislative history can be compared.  
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Judges’ reliance on precedent is unmistakable. Whether writing 
for the majority, concurring, or dissenting, and whether in the 
primary or some later method of justifying the decision, judges 
turned to what other judges had done in other cases a majority of the 
time (with one exception—dissenting judges, second method). 
Summary dispositions also were frequently made. Beyond that, 
however, there seems to be no discernable pattern and no 
predominate method upon which judges relied, nor were many of 
these patterns statistically significant.70 While these results may not 
be surprising, they nevertheless sustain the conclusion that 
interpreting the Internal Revenue Code is not the product of a rational 
approach to statutory construction. 
Attempts to discern other patterns, whether through other cross-
tabulations or means comparison, also were unproductive. Either the 
results were not statistically significant or even approached statistical 
significance, which meant that a pattern about how judges acted 
could not be said to have been established, or else the results 
evidenced weak or largely unexplainable patterns.71 
 
 70. Statistical significance negates the possibility that the results were random. It may be 
inferred that patterns are discernible. I sought descriptive statistics that were either statistically 
significant (p-values < .01 or .05) or else that which approached statistical significance (p-value 
< .10). See generally Brudney et al., supra note 1, at 1709 n.121 (designating p = .05 as 
threshold for significance and p = .10 as threshold for approaching significance).  
 Statistical significance was examined through cross-tabulations, which were made in two 
ways: by cross-tabulating (1) all of the methods in one type of opinion against each other (i.e., 
first majority method by second majority method by third majority method), and (2) each 
method in one type of opinion against all other opinions of the same type (i.e., first majority 
method by second majority method, first majority method by third majority method, and second 
majority method by third majority method). Using the first way, only the patterns involving 
precedent in the majority opinions were statistically significant (p < .01). More patterns were 
statistically significant when using the latter cross-tabulations, generating the following p 
values: first majority method x second majority method, p < .05; first majority method x third 
majority method, p < .01; second majority method x third majority method, p < .01; first 
concurring method x third concurring method, p < .10; first dissenting method x third dissenting 
method, p < .10. 
 71. Cross-tabulations were calculated between each of the discrete independent variables 
and all of the methods that could be used as either the first, second, or third means of justifying 
decisions. For example, gender was compared among majority decisions, first method of 
justifying a decision in which use of all six methods was raised; majority decisions, second 
method of justification, all six methods being raised, etc. In contrast, means for all of the 
continuous independent variables were compared in each of the methods of interpretation used 
first, second, and last in the majority opinions, and so on. In other words, means for seniority 
was compared in majority opinions, first method of interpretation, legislative history (using 
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Generally, the strongest patterns are the most common. For 
example, occurrence of more frequent statistically significant cross-
tabulations involving judges’ gender would suggest that gender is a 
way in which to describe the patterns by which judges used certain 
methods of interpretation to justify their decisions.72 Similarly, 
repeated statistically significant differences of the means regarding 
judges’ seniority would suggest that seniority could be employed to 
describe the methods judges had used to justify their decisions. As 
noted, however, the statistical significance of the results were less 
than overwhelming.73 
Whether the independent variable was the taxpayer’s 
representation by a lawyer, the judge’s religion, or the judge’s race, 
the results were meager. Results that were statistically significant, or 
approached significance, seemed to have been generated more by 
continuous than discrete variables. Of these statistically significant 
results, one way to parse them is to distinguish between the less and 
more “sophisticated” or theoretical methods of interpreting the 
Internal Revenue Code—summary dispositions and mere reliance 
upon precedent, as opposed to any of the other four, more technical, 
methods of interpretation.74 
Using that approach, a general pattern might be discerned in the 
eliteness of the judges’ college educations, with judges who had gone 
to less elite colleges tending to justify their decisions with the less 
sophisticated approaches and judges who had gone to more elite 
schools relying on the more technical approaches. This observation 
holds true across the breadth of opinion, with no apparent differences 
between majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions.75 Similarly, but 
somewhat less convincingly, judges with more seniority seem to rely 
 
dummy variables, legislative history v. all other methods), majority opinions, first method of 
interpretation, reliance on regulations (again involving dummy variables, relying on regulations 
v. all other methods), etc.  
 72. For example, gender could be tested against each of the six options for the first, 
second, and third methods of justification in the majority opinions, thereby producing eighteen 
instances in which gender could be statistically significant. The same could be done for the 
concurring and the dissenting opinions. Means could be tested for seniority in each of the three 
methods of justification in the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.  
 73. These results are set forth in the Appendix, in Tables A1 through A8. 
 74. See Sisk, supra note 1, at 1463-65. 
 75. See infra Appendix, at Table A1. 
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more on the less sophisticated approaches, while the more junior 
judges relied upon the more technical approaches. 
The most intriguing aspect of the statistically significant cross-
tabulations regarding judges’ prior work experiences and the legal 
status of the taxpayer76 is the use of the more technical approaches to 
interpreting the Code. While reliance on precedent and summary 
dispositions might be expected,77 the judges in these cross-tabulations 
also relied more on other, technical, grounds to justify their decisions 
than proportionate numbers might have suggested. 
B. Logistic Regressions—What Predicted How a Judge Would 
Decide? 
As with the descriptive statistics, there were few statistically 
significant regressions, or even regressions approaching statistical 
significance, from which to infer that characteristics of judges’ social 
backgrounds or aspects of the cases generally predict outcome.78 
Indeed, only the regressions for methods used in majority opinions 
are reproduced in the Appendix because none of the regressions for 
concurring or dissenting opinions led to statistically significant 
 
 76. See infra Appendix, at Tables A3, A8. 
 77. See supra Tables 5–7. 
 78. The regressions are set forth, infra Appendix, at Tables A9–A11. Multicollinearity 
was not problematic here. As has been suggested, what constitutes collinearity is not clear. See 
Schneider, supra note 3, at 345 n.101; Sisk et al., supra note 1, at 1432 n.233. Both adopt a 
model permitting collinearity where the bivariate correlation does not exceed .500; independent 
variables that would exceed .500 are excluded. With only one exception, the correlations 
between independent variables in regressions never went beyond +/- 240. The correlation 
between eliteness of college and law schools attended by the judges was .540. This was not 
surprising, as both variables have been viewed as indicators of social-economic status. 
Education, especially undergraduate education, is a strong socioeconomic marker. In other 
words, students who graduate from more elite colleges generally come from more privileged 
backgrounds than those who attend less elite colleges. See, e.g., James C. Hearn, Pathways to 
Attendance at the Elite Colleges, in THE HIGH-STATUS TRACK: STUDIES OF ELITE SCHOOLS 
AND STRATIFICATION 121, 122, 130-36 (Paul William Kingston & Lionel S. Lewis eds., 1990). 
The same assertion can be made for elite law schools, although the evidence is weaker. See, 
e.g., LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LEGAL EDUCATION AT THE CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
20-44 (1995). The risk presented by multicollinearity between these two variables 
notwithstanding, each has been used because of its importance to my other research. 
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results, or results that even approached statistical significance.79 
Again I conclude that the absence of many statistically significant 
regressions means that the method of justifying their decisions was 
not very important to the judges in the sampled cases. 
One independent variable seems to appear more often: the legal 
status or type of taxpayer. This variable—namely, whether the 
taxpayer was an individual, business, etc.—appeared more frequently 
than others among the regressions that were statistically significant or 
approached statistical significance. The exponentiated  for this legal 
status also usually exceeded 1, thereby suggesting that a particular 
status increased the odds ratio of a particular method of statutory 
construction being used.80 Further inspection also suggests that 
stronger associations existed between type of taxpayer and more 
sophisticated methods of interpretation. In other words, whether the 
taxpayer was a business or a trust or estate was more strongly 
correlated with the use of a sophisticated method of interpretation 
than with a summary disposition.  
Seniority also correlated negatively. In other words, judges were 
less likely to use various methods of interpretation—regulations as a 
first method in majority opinions; legislative history, regulations, or 
structure as a third method in majority opinions—to justify their 
 
 79. Multinomial logistic regression was used to establish the connection between the 
independent and dependent variables. Logistic regression is well suited for the mix of 
continuous and discrete independent variables used here, permitting the effect of each 
independent variable to be isolated while controlling for the influence of other independent 
variables, and also measuring the magnitude of the influence. See Brudney et al., supra note 1, 
at 1680. 
 In turn, multinomial logistic regression predicts and measures associations by assessing the 
likelihood of an event’s occurrence, and by doing so in relation to a reference category. In the 
logistic regression tables, Exp.  can be said to state the odds ratio of an event’s occurrence. See 
SPSS REGRESSION MODELS 9.0 40-42 (1999); cf. Bohrnstedt & Knoke, supra note 61, at 178-
81 (discussing odds and odds ratios). In Table A9, infra Appendix, for example, the odds that 
the judge would use the structure of the Code as the first method for justifying his majority 
decision was 5.56 times greater if the taxpayer was a business than if it was a member of the 
referent category, a taxpayer who was an individual. Exp.  for that type of taxpayer was 5.56 
when structure was used.  
 Logistic regression also permits the ordering of multiple independent variables. For 
example, the odds were even greater (9.39) that the judge would use Code structure when the 
taxpayer was a trust or estate. 
 80. See infra Appendix, at Tables A9-A11. 
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decisions.81 That the judge was a woman, Latino, or Jewish 
occasionally led to positive correlations,82 and eliteness of education 
had both positive and negative correlations.83 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
To summarize the results, and my interpretation of these results, 
there were relatively few descriptive statistics that were statistically 
significant. There were also relatively few regressions about judges’ 
methods of justifying their decisions, such that it was difficult to 
predict how they might justify their decisions in this database. From 
these two sets of results, I conclude that the method of justifying a 
decision was not very important to the judges who decided the cases 
in the database. 
It also appears that the results in this Article are consistent with 
my earlier article regarding methods of construction used to interpret 
the Internal Revenue Code. Social background factors are not highly 
predictive of how judges justify their tax decisions in the databases I 
assembled about recent appellate decisions, nor are aspects of the 
litigation themselves, such as whether the taxpayer was represented 
by a lawyer. 
 
 81. See infra Appendix, at Tables A9, A11. 
 82. See infra Appendix, at Tables A10-A11. 
 83. See infra Appendix, at Tables A10-A11. 
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